נגמ"ש זחלי כבד אחיד – צורך מיידי
http://www.fresh.co.il/vBulletin/showthread.php?t=227907&highlight=%F0%E2%EE%22%F9+%EB%E1%E3
Since gm4450, opened the important discussion linked above, I have been meaning to add my thoughts on this topic. Instead, I’ll take advantage of this related thread here to answer an old question:
Was there really a lack of Heavy Armored Personnel Carriers (HAPCs) in the IDF during the summer of 2006?
I’m not so sure. In the photo above you can see a column of Achzariot parked on the road outside Kibbutz Malchia. I saw them there on Thursday evening Aug 10 before the “big offensive” at the end of the war. We exited from Lebanon the following Wednesday August 16 and the tightly-parked column of apparently unused Achzariot had grown even more to what I estimate to be more than enough for a battalion. I saw some of these being trucked north (I assume from Gaza) on the highways when I drove back from a short visit home a few days beforehand.
So why were these precious HAPC left unutilized while the infantry walked and Merkava tanks were used as supply and evacuation vehicles? Maybe because their owners, the only soldiers that knew how to operate them had moved north on foot beyond B’nt J’bel, and no one else knew what to do with them?
To paraphrase what OfferD once said: in a war, the units that are deployed for a mission are those units that are available on the scene, not necessarily those specially trained for the mission.
ציטוט:
במקור נכתב על ידי [/color
[color=black]קגנס]אני מניח שעדיף לצייד 2 חטיבות באופן חלקי (נאמר, בסד"כ המתאים ל-6 או 7 פלוגות) מאשר חטיבה אחת באופן מלא. בזמן עימות לא כלהכח החטיבתי יהיה תחת אותו סיכון.
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ציטוט:
במקור נכתב על ידי [/color
[color=black]סמבוסק]מבלי לפגוע באף גולנצ'יק, רמת אחזקת הכלים והטיפולים לאכזריות בהם נתקלתי במהלך השנים היו מזעזעים!!!
הייתי עד למקרים רבים של כלים שהושבתו רגע לפני פעילותמבצעית (מארבים בלבנון, פעילות ביו"ש בחומת מגן ובכלל) או תרגיל גדול רק בגלל הזנחהואי טיפול.
חינוך של חייל חי"ר לחיבור לכלי שלו, לטפולים שוטפיםולאחזקה נכונה לוקח חודשים רבים.
זה תלוי מאוד אם יהיו לכל יחידה כלים קבועים שלה או שאלהיהיו נגמ"שי "זונה" שעוברים מיחידה ליחידה ואף אחד לאבאמתאחראילהם.
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I also agree with the above two statements.
I think that the answer to these issues and the best way to utilize the Namer and Achzarit HAPCs is in separate armored transport units that will not belong to any of the Infantry brigades. These units will only provide the Namer vehicle with the driver and the vehicle commander/gunner who are the specialists with this vehicle and know how to properly operate and maintain the vehicle. (Of course manpower to help maintaining the HAPC should come from the infantry, but the Namer is their “baby
The HAPC unit should also have its organic maintenance/logistic support unit familiar with the vehicle. The idea is to treat a Namer HAPC in the same way has you would treat a Blackhawk helicopter or an armored Safari truck used for infantry transport. This way the limited number of HAPC could be moved and utilized wherever they are most needed.
The basic Organic vehicle of all the IDF infantry units should remain the M113, which despite various complaints, is relatively easy to maintain and reliable even when neglected, and allows the infantry soldiers to focus on being infantry, while providing all the Infantry units with a capability for tactical mobility with protection against small arms and artillery fragments.
Some additional advantages of this setup:
- Namer crews build and maintain a vast experience of armored infantry tactics and combined-arms tactics and can pass this useful knowledge-base to whoever the current “clients” are, whether they be Golani, Paratroopers, Engineers, reservists, etc.
- Rather than lose 2 infantry soldiers from each squad who stay behind with the vehicle when the infantry disembark, the organic crew stays with the vehicle and can continue to operate independently, to be utilized by other units or in other sectors, if necessary.
The US Marine Corp operates their tracked AAA7 amphibious vehicles in this way with I think one “amphibious transport” battalion per infantry division.
Whether the HAPC units should belong to the armored corp. or to the infantry corp., I don’t know. Ego problems can be fulfilled by giving them red boots, a flat-top mini-mekutrarararXL, a spotted beret, a sikat lochem bigger then any else’s, etc.
One more comment: I hope that they increase the side of the back door/ramp of the Namer in the production models. The large rear ramp of the M113 is one of its best features as an APC, making it such a flexible and useful vehicle. It makes it possible for the infantry to quickly exit two at a time safely from the back, as well as to easily load/unload wounded and supplies. The current back door of the Namer is inadequate.