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29-11-2022, 20:46
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збш оъашйк: 11.01.14
дегтеъ: 1,392
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жд аеъе оаош амйе чйщшъй бъвебд 9
лод фрйрйн ресфеъ:
дфццеъ:
цйиеи:
At the start of the invasion, Russian Sukhoi Su-34 ‘frontal bomber’ and Su-30SM and Su-35S
multi-role fighter aircraft flew around 140 sorties per day, conducting fighter sweeps and strike
sorties up to 300 km inside Ukrainian territory at altitudes of between 12,000 ft and 30,000 ft.17
During the first three days, the primary targets of these VKS strikes were Ukrainian air defences.
Over 100 fixed long-range radar installations, bases, munitions storage sites and positions
occupied by mobile long- and medium-range SAM systems were attacked, with Russian fixed-
wing sorties concentrating their activities along the routes intended to be used by airborne and
helicopter assault forces.18
Notably, all the medium- and high-level strikes were conducted against pre-designated locations
that had been extensively mapped by Su-24MR reconnaissance bombers. The Ukrainian Air
Force observed that the latter constantly flew two-four sorties per day at medium to high
altitude along Ukraine’s borders from early February to the end of April.19
Su-34s carried out
the bulk of the strikes with multiple unguided FAB-500 and OFAB-250 bombs, and, during the
first week, typically operated at medium altitudes of around 12,000 ft.20
Most of these medium-level daylight strikes were carried out by single aircraft, with fewer than
25% of strikes conducted by pairs or larger formations; and none were observed that involved
more than six aircraft in a strike package.21
This contributed to inconsistent damage results as
well as inefficient battle damage assessment (BDA), meaning that follow-up strikes were seldom
carried out.22
Nevertheless, VKS fixed-wing air strikes were effective in the south, where, in
conjunction with cruise and ballistic missiles, attacks badly degraded the limited Ukrainian
Air Force and Naval air-defence capacity deployed in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.23
However, most of the targets hit were static radars and outdated S-125 (SA-3) SAM sites, and the
only serious damage was to Ukrainian mobile SAM systems against trailer and truck-mounted
S-300PS/PT units that either received too little warning to be able to move, or were stuck due
to lack of spare parts.24
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аеейш-аеейш
цйиеи:
Ukrainian pilots confirm that Russia’s Su-30SM and Su-35S completely outclass Ukrainian Air
Force fighter aircraft on a technical level. The long range and good look-down, shoot-down
performance of their N011M Bars and N035 Irbis-E radars, and the much longer reach and
active-radar guidance capability of the R-77-1 air-to-air missile compared with the semi-active
R-27R/ER available to Ukrainian fighters, are the most important aspects of this technical
overmatch.26Throughout the war, Russian fighters have frequently been able to achieve a radar
lock and launch R-77-1 missiles at Ukrainian fighters from over 100 km away.27Even though
such shots have a low probability of kill, they force Ukrainian pilots to go defensive or risk being
hit while still far outside their own effective range, and a few such long-range shots found their
mark. Furthermore, the R-77-1’s active radar seeker, combined with the modern N011M and
N035 radars, give Russian fighters the ability to launch missiles in track-while-scan (TWS) mode,
meaning that Ukrainian pilots are unlikely to get warning from their radar-warning receivers
(RWRs) that they have been launched on until the missile itself goes active a few seconds before
it hits.28In contrast, the R-27R/ER missiles that Ukrainian fighters are armed with require a
single target track (STT) lock to be maintained by the launching fighter’s own radar throughout a
missile engagement.29This means that Russian pilots receive an RWR warning when a Ukrainian
pilot launches a radar-guided missile at them, and that if the Ukrainian fighter even briefly loses
radar lock during missile flight, due to either side manoeuvring, deploying countermeasures or
electronic warfare, then the missile will miss.
This deeply unequal radar and missile performance compared with Russian fighters, as well
as being tactically outnumbered by up to 15:2 in some cases, forced Ukrainian pilots to fly
extremely low to try to exploit ground clutter and terrain masking to get close enough to fire
before being engaged.30This was still highly dangerous, and flying low further increased the
range discrepancy between the effective ranges of Russian and Ukrainian air-to-air missiles,since Russian fighters were at higher speeds and high altitude, giving their missiles much more
energy at launch.
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щадг-136
мфй дъйаеш бфегчси, мщадг йщ 4 отшлеъ дрзййд
GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou
еотшлъ шбйтйъ щощеед дбгмйн бйп дщмещ дшащереъ.
цйиеи:
The second significant consequence of Russia’s ineffective (albeit very destructive) initial standoff
missile campaigns and limited remaining stockpiles was a deal with Iran to supply large numbers
of Shahed-136 loitering munitions and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) support to
teach Russian units to assemble and use them. The first Shahed-136 (Russian name, ‘Geran-2’
attacks were recorded by Ukrainian air defenders in mid-September, with attacks against Odesa
alongside Iranian-supplied armed Mohajer-6 UAVs.142An IRGC training group protected by
an FSB security detail was identified and monitored by Ukrainian intelligence services, and
destroyed with a precision artillery strike in Kherson around this time.143Unfortunately this did
not end the Russian acceptance and ramp-up process for large-scale Shahed-136 use as a long-
range strike weapon.
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Sing while you may
- The Legendary Pink Dots
ртшк мазшерд т"й Nargila Dwarf бъашйк 29-11-2022 бщтд 21:03.
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