30-08-2014, 16:29
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חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
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מאמרים של מכון המחקר "רוסי"
בתגובה להודעה מספר 1 שנכתבה על ידי Narion שמתחילה ב "השתלטות ארגון ISIS על עיראק וכיבוש מזרח סוריה (2)"
The US Attack on ISIS – Fool Us Once, Shame On You; Fool Us Twice, Shame on Us; Fool
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/comme...D/#.VABoqPmSx8k
While the US relies on limited air attacks and equips the peshmerga as a defensive rather than offensive force, the initiative remains with ISIS, as does the opportunity for them to exploit their opponents’ continued strategic miscalculation.
?IS ISIS A THREAT TO THE UK
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/comme...9/#.VABoo_mSx8k
The murder of American journalist James Foley brought global attention to the menace of ISIS. But what kind of a threat does the group actually pose beyond the Levant?
Turkey’s Response to ISIS and the Crisis in Iraq
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/comme...8/#.VABoqvmSx8k
Turkey may now regret its earlier decision to allow and support un-vetted foreign fighters into Syria through their borders. Yet, even though ISIS fighters kidnapped Turkish diplomats in Mosul, Ankara is sticking to its policy of demanding change in Syria and Iraq.
The Advance of ISIS: Why Iraqi Soldiers Deserted
https://www.rusi.org/publications/n...A/#.VABqfPmSx8k
British Options in Iraq: Capabilities, Strategies, and Risks
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/comme...B/#.VABop_mSx8l
Pressure is building for the government to recall parliament over the crisis in Iraq and consider intervening alongside US forces. But what are the options for Britain, and what risks do they carry?
Second, What Capabilities Can Britain Provide?
The large-scale use of ground forces is exceptionally improbable. But smaller numbers of British special forces, which played a prominent and significant role in the Libya conflict, and some of whom might be safely assumed to be in Erbil and Baghdad already, could be an important contribution to reconnaissance or even forward air control missions. They have over a quarter-century’s experience of operating in Iraq’s northern areas, strong ties to the peshmerga, and are viewed as especially effective by the US and regional allies. Nor would their deployment invite the same political scrutiny that a more overt and extensive campaign might.
With regard to military assets, Britain could provide refuelling aircraft, further reconnaissance platforms (such as the Sentinel), transport aircraft (Chinook helicopters are being sent), and the use of strike aircraft, including the Tornado fighter jets that have been sent to Cyprus. But the logistical and financial implications could be considerable, potentially requiring an operation equal or larger to that mounted in Libya in 2011, depending on its scale (see the next section).
Britain also enjoys a number of regional bases, including Al-Minhad airbase south of Dubai, the UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) in Bahrain’s Salman Naval Base, and a network of military personnel across the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Jordan. These could facilitate any British operations. However, these host governments have been highly sceptical of the Maliki government, viewing it as unduly close to Iran, and are likely to view Iran’s role in supporting Maliki’s would-be successor, Haider al-Abadi, with similar concern. They might therefore oppose any use of their soil.
Third, What are the Risks?
The first type of risk is military: ISIS possesses some air-defence capabilities, including shoulder-fired SA-7s as well as towed and mounted anti-aircraft guns. The risk to British aircraft would be slight but present, particularly during low-altitude humanitarian airdrops in ISIS-controlled areas and during any close air support missions for Iraqi government or Kurdish forces.
US airdrop missions in the past week, which reportedly spent '15 minutes at a low altitude', have been accompanied by F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets for just this reason. British airdrops do not appear to have taken similar precautions, although the reason for this is unclear. US aircraft have not been targeted by ISIS, although Kurdish helicopters have been struck by small-arms fire and the anti-air threat may have deterred a broader helicopter-based evacuation of Yazidis.
With regard to potential British training missions, a classified US assessment from July suggests that Iraqi security forces are so heavily compromised by Sunni extremists or pro-Iran elements that embedded Western trainers might be at risk. It is unlikely, though, that this is any more severe than that faced by UK trainers and mentors in Afghanistan.
נערך לאחרונה ע"י strong1 בתאריך 30-08-2014 בשעה 16:38.
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