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מסמכי CIA חדשים על גיחות ה GIANT REACH
בתגובה להודעה מספר 69 שנכתבה על ידי strong1 שמתחילה ב "פרטים נוספים על הגיחות - מהספר שהוזכר על ידי גיל חזקיה"
בתחילת החודש (פברואר 2013) חשף ארכיון ה CIA מנה גדושה של כ 400 מסמכים הנוגעים לפעילות הארגון סביב מלחמת יוה"כ (לפני, במהלך ואחריה), מחציתם בפרסום ראשון, זאת בהמשך ליום עיון מעניין שהתקיים בסוף ינואר תחת הכותרת President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. גם ביום העיון (5 שעות וידאו זמין ב YOUTUBE) וגם במסמכים יש פרטים מעניינים רבים (גם אם לא גילויים דרמטיים) מהם נביא באשכולות הרלוונטיים. נתחיל עם גיחות ה GIANT REACH המוזכרות במספר מסמכים, שלמרבה הצער חלקים רבים בהם נותרו REDUCTED גם ממרום 40 שנים.
מסמך מ 22 לאוקטובר הסוקר את האפשרויות העומדות בפני האמריקנים
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau.../1973-10-22.pdf
SR-71 and U-2R reconnaissance aircraft are the only systems available to the US which are capable of providing regular photographic coverage of cease-fire lines
and related logistical and support areas.
While photography from SR-71 or U-2R systems will be adequate to verify that no major changes are taking place in the disposition of opposing forces, these systems cannot provide warning of rapid changes, evidence of ctivities in rear areas., or preparations for limited scale actions. -
c. The SR-71 is capable of flying in either a hostile or permissive environment.
The U-2R cannot operate effectively in a hostile SA-2 environment and would therefore, require mutual acceptance for it to be effective.
Egyptian troop concentrations beyond this penetration are also of concern. This area could only be monitored by an overflight--peripheral missions flown to. the east of Egyptian dispositions along the canal would not provide coverage adequate to monitor activity there. In addition, the absence of well defined geographic features in this desert area will make the exact fixing of a cease-fire line difficult if not impossible.
SAC believes that a mission with all cameras (optical bar for area coverage, technical objectives for spot coverage) could be accomplished every 48 hours (only one optical bar camera is currently available at Griffiss). Also, it takes a minimum of 36 hours to get the tankers up to their refueling points, land to top off again and backin place at Torrejon, Spain. Tanker crew rest is also important so SAC would prefer missions to be flown no more frequent than 72 hours apart.
Based on the above and on the performance of the first mission on 13 October, a mission (if SAC is ordered back on a 12 hours status, and if the decision is made by about noon, EDT) could have an. SR-71 over the target area by noon (Mid-East time) the following day. After a 11-12 - hour mission, the mission film could be at Eastman Kodak 'at about 4 PM EDT, about four hours after landing, processed and delivered to NPIC by noon the following day, the first readout becoming available some 4 to 5 hours 1ater (about 4 to 5 PM EDT), with all highlights completed by about 9 AM the following morning. Or, summarizing, first readout could be available abcut 50 hours after the decision to go was communicated to the operators
Utilization of the U-2 in this area is highly sensitive and diplomatic approvals of the governments involved would be required prior to operational missions. The following items are considered significant:
Flights to provide coverage of both sides of the Suez Canal would require both Israeli and Arab approval. Should either Israel or Egypt not concur in this overflight, modified coverage from the air space of the concurring nation would be possible.
Photographic coverage can be provided in the area affected by the cease-fire from several Mediterranean areas. Specifically, operations could be conducted from Italy (Brindisi, Sigonella), Greece (Elefsis), Crete (Souda Bay),or Cyprus (Akrotiri). Another option could be operation from Tel.Aviv proper. Operation from Spain would not allow desired altitude of 69,000 feet in target area. Incirlik AB, Turkey would also be a suitable base for operations. All of the foregoing options would require approval by third party governments prior to utilization of their territory
as a' forward base for operational sorties
In general, areas of intelligence interest in the UAR and Syria are assumed to be SAM defended. Present hostilities have indicated a nonstatic defense. A well
developed early warning and GCI radar network exists. A U-2R overflight would be identified and tracked accurately. enoloved SA-2 defenses would constitute a valid
The "H" camera, "B" camera and IRIS are available configurations that can be utilized dependent upon the physical location of the target area and political restraints or overflight prohibitions. The "H" and "B" cameras are the most capable of providing the resolution required for photographic interpretation.
מסמך מה 24 לאוקטובר הממשיך את אותו הדיון
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau...1973-10-24F.pdf
In Syria, coverage of Allepo and Tiyas airfields is to assess air re-supply activities, and coverage of other airfields (Dumayr, Marj Ruhayyil, T-4, and Khalkhalah) is to assess possible Israeli strike damage and current AOB. Coverage of Egyptian Airfields Hurghada, Wadi Abut Shihyat, Luxor, Daraw, and Aswan is for AOB,
מסמך מה 21 לנובמבר הבוחן את אפשרויות הכיסוי לאור הגיחות הקודמות כולל צפי להמשכן עד לינואר 1974 לפחות
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau...3-11-23B-CM.pdf
The overall SR-71 results have been good considering all factors. However, the one-ata-time planning, review, and policy approval procedure is poorly suited for effective longer term reconnaissance. Satellite reconnaissance has been effective
in providing important information both in the Middle East and support areas in the USSR, but some information has not been timely because of the elapsed time between imagery operations and recovery, processing, and review of the film.
The SR-71 has the capability of covering most, but not all, primary objectives in the Middle East on a single mission with rapid availability of derived information but represents a complex undertaking which has inherent risks and some political drawbacks. Satellite reconnaissance is unobtrusive but cannot photograph all objectives of interest on the' same day or return the film for immediate review and
reporting. The overall situation calls for the use of both collection systems,
coordinated in such a way as to take advantage of their inherent strengths
while minimizing their limitations.
מטרות הגיחות
Soviet Presence in the Middle East either in terms of the introduction of combat or support troops, or in the logistical resupply and training of Arab forces.
b. Monitoring Cease-Fire or Other Lines of Demarcation including the status and disposition of opposing combat and support forces along and in the
rear of these lines.
c. Potential Build-up Areas and Logistical Support Bases to detect buildups or preparations for renewal of hostilities or other activities contrary to the spirit or letter of understandings or agreements
d. Weapons Delivery and Deployment with emphasis on the detection of new or advanced weapons which would affect the military balance in the region.
The SR-71 mission survivability has been evaluated extensively by the DoD with the conclusion that its present defensive systems and operational characteristics should insure survivability against all known threats in the Middle East. The survivability analyses have-been recently re-examined and reaffirmed. It must be recognized, however, that there is always some risk of operational failure and both the international and U.S. domestic implications of a reconnaissance loss in the Middle East should be recognized and weighed in connection with the reconnaissance
plan outlined below
שני מסמכים עוסקים בגיחת ה 2 לדצמבר 1973.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau...73-11-29-CM.pdf
המסמך הראשון מה 29 לנובמבר - מדוע נזקקו לגיחה?
Coverage of the Durma area near Damascus continues to be inconclusive as to the presence or absence of Soviet combat units. High-resolution coverage with the SR-71 tech objective camera plus the additional comparative coverage that would be
obtained may provide insight on this question, although it cannot be guaranteed.
בהקשר של הסקאדים שנידונו באשכול הנפרד על גיחות העומק במצרים וסוריה.
The satellite coverage continues to be inconclusive on SCUD activity. Additional coverage would provide some possibility of providing data on this problem
מסמך מה 30/11/73 שימו לב לדרגים הבכירים מעורבים באישור כל גיחת "אמת" של SR-71A וחשיבות חיזוי מזג האוויר (שנכשל! ראו הגיחה הבאה).
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau.../1973-11-30.pdf
מסמך מה 6/12/73 אישור גיחה חוזרת אחרי כשלון גיחת ה 2 לדצמבר בגלל עננות
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/defau...73-12-06-CM.pdf
The 2 December GIANT REACH mission encountered bad weather; approximately 80 percent of the area photographed was cloud or haze-covered. As a consequence, the mission yielded only fragmentary information on those areas of military activity that continue to be of highest priority concern.
שוב אזכור של הסקאדים, שימו גם לב לאזכור הנדיר של אדמירל דה פוי, מנהל ה DIA באותן השנים
Intelligence continues to be inconclusive on SCUD activity in the UAR, although reports continue. Additional photo-coverage could provide data on this problem, and would be planned with this in mind.
הסבר נוסף לתזמון הגיחה => העדר כיסוי לווין
The next increment of satellite photography will not be recovered until about 16 December, and will be available for readout about 18-19 December
נערך לאחרונה ע"י strong1 בתאריך 26-02-2013 בשעה 23:11.
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21-10-2008, 15:46
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