Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System
The Army, working with industry teams, subsequently tested , selected and deployed the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS), a reconfigured version of the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, as the “near-term” C-RAM interceptor. CPT Scott Mace, commander of C Battery, 5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery, the “prototype” C-RAM battery, describes the LPWS in an article titled “C:RAM: Air Defense Artillery Takes On New Counter-Rockets, Artillery and Mortars Intercept Mission,” which appears in the July-September 2005 issue of Air Defense Artillery magazine. (The issue is available online in PDF format at
http://www.firsttofire.com/adamag.) The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the C-RAM battery concept proposed to satisfy the near-term need for a C-RAM organization.
Seven Pillars of C-RAM
The C-RAM mission is partitioned into seven functions, referred to as “pillars:” Shape, Sense, Warn, Intercept, Respond, Command and Control, and Protect. (Shape consists of actions taken to deny the enemy's use of tactically advantageous terrain or to channel enemy forces into areas where they can be observed. Respond is the application of lethal fires before or after RAM attacks. Protect is actions taken to harden sites or disperse assets to mitigate the effects of RAM attacks.)
The C-RAM interceptor is only one portion of series of materiel solutions that fit into a C-RAM “system of systems.” The C-RAM battery employs four primary systems. The Light Weight Counter Mortar system (LCMR) provides 360-degree capability to detect incoming RAM threats. The Sentinel radar is the primary system used to protect friendly aircraft operating near the C-RAM interceptor. The LPWS is a 20mm Gatlin-type gun that provides the intercept capability. The Wireless Audio Visual Emergency System (WAVES) takes input from the LCMR and other local sensors, such as the AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder 36, 37 or 46 radar, and warns Soldiers within the defended zone whose position places them within the predicted impact area of incoming attacks. The Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (FAADC3I) is the system that ties all of the data together, automatically cues the LPWS, notifies Field Artillery units of the attack’s point of origin so they might fire counter-battery missions, and sends the warnings to WAVES for announcement to the defended site.
In late November 2005, the Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, acting in its role as the “lead” C-RAM combat developer, forwarded a C-RAM force design update proposal to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command that advocates a battery-level organization as an interim solution to the RAM threat. In formulating the proposal, we considered three different-sized organizations: platoon, battery and battalion. Based on our analysis, the battery is the best organization to meet the very near-term need. Although the battery solution does not meet “objective” C-RAM requirements in their entirety, it is the best option under current materiel availability constraints. In the future, we may need a battalion-sized C-RAM organization to fully capitalize on the array of sensors employed for C-RAM and to serve as the focal point for C-RAM employment within division-sized areas of operations (AOR.
The C-RAM battery organization, with its three platoons, provides a commander the ability to completely accomplish four of the seven C-RAM functions: Sense, Warn, Intercept and Command and Control. These functions are executed by the combined efforts of a C-RAM battery and the brigade combat team it supports or in whose AOR it is employed. The C-RAM battery indirectly supports the Protect, Shape and Respond pillars. For example, over the course of a C-RAM battery mission, the sensors will accumulate precise data on the origin, time and type of attacks. This data will help analysts as well as commanders decide how and where to employ limited Protect assets, how to focus Response efforts at the right place and time, and determine where Shape efforts will be the most effective. Additionally, the C-RAM battery commander will assist and advise the supported commander in determining how to deploy the C-RAM battery, how to prioritize critical assets and how to fuse C-RAM data to coordinate preparations for and reactions to RAM attacks.
Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar Concept
C-RAM Battery Rank Structure
An ADA major will command the C-RAM battery and an ADA captain will serve as the executive officer. This higher-than-normal rank structure is necessary to facilitate the integration of the C-RAM battery into its supported unit structure. This is especially important when task organizing with additional platoons or when spreading out Sense and Warn sections over large areas. The C-RAM battery rank structure provides the experience necessary to command the unit and better assist supported unit commanders with critical asset prioritization. This rank structure also provides the depth of experience in air and missile defense operations necessary for an AOR to benefit from, not only the C-RAM sensors, but from other employed air and missile defense assets. The ADA major will have a greater familiarity with air and missile defense operations based on previous assignments and overall experience.
Air and Missile Defense Transformation is reshaping the ADA force structure. In the near future, Air Defense Artillery will deploy eight “pure” Patriot battalions, five composite air and missile defense battalions with a mix of Patriot and Avenger batteries. The Avenger batteries will be replaced by Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) batteries. C-RAM batteries may be assigned to air and missile defense brigades for training and readiness oversight, but in the near-term will be employed as separate batteries supporting brigade combat teams or base commanders. The C-RAM batteries will depend on the units they support for combat health support as well as religious, legal, finance, personnel and administrative services. The C-RAM batteries will also require communication security (COMSEC) equipment maintenance support.
We decided to recommend C-RAM batteries rather than C-RAM platoons as the interim C-RAM organization because our analysis revealed the platoon-sized organization is not a feasible solution for accomplishing the complete set of C-RAM functions, including planning, preparation and execution. A C-RAM platoon would be completely capable of supporting the Sense, Warn, and Intercept pillars of the C-RAM mission, but would not provide sufficient infrastructure to facilitate planning and integration of the multiple platoons necessary to protect a large operating base, critical assets such as airports or seaports, or other similar large or dispersed assets. The platoon structure lacks an engagement operations section needed to integrate into a supported unit’s structure. It also lacks the manpower necessary to sustain operations for long periods of time. The C-RAM platoon leader serves as the weapons control officer/tactical control officer who makes the decision to engage RAM targets. The platoon leader’s primary duty will be in execution. He or she would have little time for planning future moves or task organization changes.
Our recommendation for the C-RAM battery organization is not based on typical force design analysis alone, but also on lessons learned from current in-theater C-RAM operations. These operations are shaping the way C-RAM units will fight in future theaters.
The proposed C-RAM battery structure will meet our needs today. Air Defense Artillery can, with some difficulty, support the C-RAM battery force structure requirements by drawing force structure from other ADA systems until the Army approves additional force structure. Deployed in sufficient numbers, LPWS-equipped C-RAM batteries can deal effectively with the RAM threat that we face into today’s theaters of operation. However, we must resist the temptation to focus on the current situation and consider future theaters of operations in which the RAM threat may be more robust.
As C-RAM matures we will need to reevaluate the organizational structure based on performance, analysis of span of control issues and materiel advances. The trailer-mounted LPWS can be easily repositioned within static defensive positions, but lacks the mobility to defend maneuver units. The objective C-RAM capability will be mobile and could include a kinetic-energy systems and, ideally, a directed-energy systems. Mobile C-RAM systems will be able to defend a much broader array of assets than near-term systems presently deployed.
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21-12-2007, 22:17
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