Hello, The following text was written by tamido and myself.
The article describes the unit structure, equipment and bits and pieces.
Enjoy.
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Oh and before anyone asks - the article passed the censor.
The Unit The unit ”Daya” (Black Kite) was a light mobile combat field intelligence unit formed in 1989 by the Artillery Corps at the outbreak of the first Intifada, when counter insurgency was deployed by the IDF to the mounting armed resistance by the Palestinians.
In parallel to the formation of Daya a designated unit was formed at 869 with similar missions and goals. The main mission of Daya was to provide intelligence surveillance at the occupied territories, specifically for the apprehension of insurgents.
The unit comprised of app. 60 personnel, and was under the direct command of the 215 Artillery Brigade. The unit was divided into teams of four soldiers led by an NCO, and two teams were placed at each of the 6 regional Brigades (HATMAR) in the West Bank and acted virtually as the organic field intelligence gathering unit of the sector.
At the unit’s inception, the unit’s soldiers were recruited and handpicked directly after Artillery school (16-17 weeks post conscription). The soldiers then passed a gruesome 7 week combat surveillance course that included two weeks of advanced infantry training at BAP-LACHISH, one week of intelligence school at Glilot and a tough 4 week combat surveillance and navigation training at the Intelligence and Reconnaissance School (MOS) in BALISH (Tze’elim).
After completing the surveillance course the new soldiers then remained at the unit for two recruitment cycles in teams designated as “greens” before either advancing to NCO school or remaining an additional one to two cycles before being shipped out to the regular artillery regiments. This custom ceased at 1993 when it was realized that the unit loses its special expertise and knowhow with the rapid transfer-out of its soldiers, and since the Artillery Corps moved to Solela Mahzorit model at that year which ascribed recruits to the regular artillery regiments from basic training course, thereby exhausting the option of the unit to recruit fresh conscripts out of Artillery School.
As far as the 215 Brigade was concerned Daya was an orphan child. As being an independent unit at the Brigade but with no artillery specific missions and with 215 having no control over its activity the unit had no mother and father at the Brigade to take care of it.
That meant that the 215 Brigade supplied Daya’s manpower, the training, personal weapons (identical to the ones given at the Battalions, as this is what they had in their armory) and 2nd grade personal equipment (as the good stuff went to the Battalions and in any case did not fit the needs of the unit). The Brigade supplied no surveillance and specialized equipment and expected the Ayosh Division to supply the teams at every Hatmar with the necessary gear (which was a sensible expectation from 215’s perspective, as the mission of Daya had nothing to do with that of 215 – but that meant that Daya was very poorly equipped to carry out its missions).
This reality made Daya act as a rogue unit, especially in its first years of formation from the understanding that it had to care of itself, on its own, in order to carry out its missions properly. In order to get supplied with the proper gear and ammunition it needed Daya’s personnel raided bases’ (that mostly hosted Daya for training) armory and supply warehouses for specific munition and gear (or as the IDF slang goes – “Hashlamat Ziyud” – gear completion). As this was done almost routinely in all bases eventually this did not go unnoticed and the unit had many “visits” from the military police (especially searching for Tzlamim) - but fortunately evidence was properly concealed and no charges were placed…
To “add crime on punishment”, as the Hebrew saying goes, as an orphan child the Daya teams at the Hatmar were also treated as a read headed step-child. Though the teams were organic to the Hatmar and resided in its premises they had no affiliation to the Hatmar’s manpower. Daya’s ways of working and daily operations contradicted the daily activity of the Hatmar’s personnel (i.e guard duty, latrine duty, kitchen duty, morning wake ups and line ups etc..) which created a lot of frustration and confrontation with the Hatmar’s administration staff (who were not part of the Hatmar’s operational HQ, which was responsible to hand down to Daya its missions), which in turn manifested in the lack of caring and catering to the unit’s administrative needs during its “off hours”. Putting it bluntly, the unit carried out missions and operations at the Hatmar’s sector, when off-duty the unit’s members were on call. This collided with the stark contradiction that all the Hatmar personnel and missions, could have been termed at best as combat support, and hence the administrative staff could not comprehend why Daya were not sharing their routine maintenance duties.
One must compare Daya to its compatriot at the time – 869 unit. 869 at the time was defined as a Matkal unit – meaning that its budget and access to resources were almost endless. It had state of the art equipment and gear of all sorts, plentiful of its own transportation solutions (Abir mini trucks, GMC vans etc…
, it was 100% independent from the Hatmar’s needs and Ayosh Division requirements, and its teams resided in the headquarters at Rama (Ramallah). Missions in different sectors were allocated to teams according to 869 decision (i.e no teams dedicated to specific sector). Its soldiers were recruited to the unit from conscription till release from service – i.e good organizational memory and ways of working.
But when comparing the operations of both units Daya compensated its lack of specialized equipment with high motivation, good knowledge of the specific sector and the terrain its teams resided at, very good communication working with the local command chain, and archaic but useful solutions from the Ugda (and in any case 15*80, 25*150 and TAS-6 solved 99% of the mission's requirements – most of the good stuff 869 had were mostly “nice to have” but not essential).
The Daya unit prided itself with numerous successful missions, bringing about the apprehension of many insurgents and helped virtually annihilate the operations of the Black Panther movement in the Jenin sector.
Unit and Team - Personal experience and day to day life
The teams lived in the Hatmar. There was the mother base in Rama (Ramallah), but it was not used for much more than administrations and the occasional exercise.
The unit was based predominantly on the NCOs and team members. The officers visited each team for some days and then moved to the next. Most of the time we did not see them, and even when they were around they did not try to take over. The NCOs did their job well, the soldiers behaved and were expected to assume the same responsibilities and professionalism of their team leader. The teams were very solidified and little or no formality existed in the teams and the entire unit.
The discipline in the artillery battalions was pretty harsh. For example the 403 battalion at the time had a constant contingent of soldiers in prison (more than one soldier). You could get a weekend detention in base for leaving an oil can open or saying the wrong thing to an NCO. Sleeping on guard duty was an automatic 64 days in jail. OTOH 403 trained a LOT and was good at artillery work. Other battalions like 404 were not as bad, but discipline was enforced and distance existed. In Daya a soldier had responsibility, which was an amazing change. Sure we goofed off, but not much. Also, any Daya soldier who came from a battalion knew that he could be kicked out of the unit and sent to back was well motivated to behave.
Next: Wheels!
ראשי
צ'אט
27-02-2006, 11:48
כמובן) והיתה קיימת תחרות בריאה בין היחידות על יוקרה ומבצעים (שכמובן 215 זכתה ברוב ההוקרה - לפחות בגזרות בהן שירתתי!
Above: Ayin Lezion! Looking for a bad man. The 15x80 (D/M=5.3) was the workhorse for close range surveillance, with a magnification large enough for medium-long distances view. The small size and low weight made it easy to carry in a backpack or a standard stretcher/water carrier. see image above of the three crossing the barb wire fence. The tripod was easy to handle as well.
Image from: 
מצב כלאיים
