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  #60  
12-06-2015, 21:10
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: 13.11.04
: 16,823
Syria Feature: The Islamic State’s War for Gas and Electricity
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http://eaworldview.com/2015/06/syri...nd-electricity/

Lying roughly 150 kilometers (93 miles) northwest of Palmyra, Shaer supplies the Ebla processing plant at Furqlus to the west, which provides commercial gas (also referred to as dry gas or treated gas) or methane to electricity-generating stations that feed into the national grid. Regime forces retained control of the actual gas fields in Shaer in July 2014, but the Islamic State seized four wells in a new attack in late October. Assad’s Syrian Arab Army once again retook the area, though the Shaer gathering station was severely damaged and most wells were shut down. A reduced supply resumed from nearby Chinese-owned wells nearby to the Hayan treatment plant and processing facility, which commenced activity in 2009 and which serves as a major LPG, oil, and condensate reserve distribution center to power plants in several parts of the country.

Faced with dense regime defenses around Shaer, the Islamic State shifted its focus to Palmyra, which has been the site of the most development in Syria’s gas sector since the mid-1990s. Fields in the area were expected to eventually produce 9 million cubic meters of crude gas per day. These included the Arak, Dubayat, Hail, Hayan, Jihar, al-Mahr, Najib, Sukhneh, and Abi Rabah fields, which according to a former industry insider have collectively been producing half of Syria’s output of natural raw and liquid petroleum gas. Palmyra is also the transit point for pipelines carrying gas from important fields in Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces in northeastern and eastern Syria respectively.

On March 1, 2015, well over two months before their capture of Palmyra, Islamic State forces took the nearby gas fields at Hail — the largest in the Palmyra area — and at Arak, triggering power cuts in Damascus. Arak, which came online in 1995, also contains a gathering plant that links main gas flows from the Palmyra area to a central station in Homs, which is connected in turn to Banyas on the Mediterranean coast. Regime forces subsequently regained these fields, but the Islamic State took conclusive control of them on May 21, along with the nearby Jazl oil field and T3 pumping station to the east of Palmyra, which used to carry oil from Iraq en route to the export terminal at Tartous on Syria’s coast.

Palmyra offers the Islamic State even greater opportunity to achieve disproportionate rewards — compared to its limited investment of combat manpower —and acquire strategic leverage. In 2013, more than 90% of Syria’s natural gas production was used to generate electricity, according to government sources. Data from 2012 showed that natural gas accounted for 6.3 million tons of oil equivalent in power generation, compared with 2.4 million tons of fuel oil.

As if to underline that the name of its game for now is denial of key resources to the regime, the Islamic State blew up a gas pipeline near regime-held Furqlus on May 31. Furqlus contains a “mega” gas field; excavation rights to the field were given to a Chinese company, but it is not yet under actual production. Of more immediate import is that the Furqlus site encompasses the Ebla treatment plant (previously operated by Suncor of Canada), the adjacent Russian-owned Gazprom treatment and distribution facility (some sources give this as Stroytransexport), and a large “tie-in” station connecting the oil and gas pipelines comprising the so-called Arab pipeline — Syria’s largest — to power stations and export terminals to the west.

So the Islamic State threat to Furqlus may be intended as a means of gaining leverage. The regime retains a very large, if old, production facility to the immediate north of nearby Homs. Conversely the Islamic State does not possess enough plants to enable it to produce and market usable gas for domestic or industrial purposes, and it is unlikely to capture what it needs in working order. So it may be seeking to compel the regime into an exchange: continued flow of gas from eastern fields to regime power plants in return for payment or electricity supply. This is the sort of deal that has allowed continued operation of the Euphrates dam near Raqqa, held by the Islamic State but maintained with technical assistance from the regime.
  #77  
16-06-2015, 08:45
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: 13.11.04
: 16,823
, ...
76 strong1 " "

Erdogan fears fall of Syria's Tell Abyad

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...i-turkmen.html#

The Tell Abyad border crossing, directly opposite Turkey’s town of Akcakale, was entrusted on Sept. 19, 2012, to a coalition of Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Burkan al-Firat and Liwa al-Tawhid Brigades. That decision had two objectives:

To distance Syrian regime forces from the border and to create a buffer zone for the opposition forces to operate freely.

To hinder the Kurds' autonomy movement in the Syrian areas Kurds control and to sever the link between the Kurdish cantons of Kobani and Jazeera in what the Kurds call Rojava (Western Kurdistan).

According to information provided by Kurdish sources to Al-Monitor, after a lull in clashes the operation to cleanse the area of Kurds began on July 19, 2013, with warning calls from mosque minarets for the Kurds to leave Tell Abyad or be punished. Of 25,000 people in Tell Abyad, which was Arabized by the Baath regime in 1963, about 12,000 were Kurds. Kurds who lived in the Tell Abyad town center and in 18 villages in its vicinity had to emigrate to the Kobani and Jazeera areas as well as to Turkey and Iraq.

Those who didn’t paid a high price. Every single Kurdish house was raided until Aug. 5, 2013. Seventy adult males were killed, and about 400 women and children were abducted. It is not known what happened to them. While the international community, not wanting to hamper the revolution, seemed not much concerned with crimes against humanity by Syrian opposition forces, the issue was put on the UN Security Council agenda by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who asked for a condemnation.

For IS, Tell Abyad and Carablus are vital links between IS headquarters at Raqqa and the Turkish border. Although the border is officially closed, traffic over it has not stopped. IS sends its casualties to hospitals in Turkey through this gate. Akcakale is also the key transit point for foreign militants to reach IS in Iraq and Syria. Those fighters have been getting their first IS training at Suluk.
  #87  
16-06-2015, 08:49
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: 13.11.04
: 16,823
IS advances in northern Aleppo
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http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...ooperation.html

IS’ attack on Aleppo’s northern countryside had been anticipated following the group’s car bomb attacks on April 7 against centers of al-Jabha al-Shamiya, which led to the killing of one of the front’s leaders and 31 other members. During a surprise attack on May 31, IS managed to take control of the town of Soran and the nearby villages of Tawqli, al-Ball and Ghazal. On June 1, it took control of the villages of Umm al-Qura and Hasajek, south of Marea.

Many rebel battalions send military reinforcements throughout the day from the western countryside of Aleppo and Idlib to Aleppo's northern countryside. These reinforcements are distributed along the front line with IS, from the Turkish border to the outskirts of the industrial city of Sheikh Najjar in Aleppo governorate. Although these reinforcements managed to stop IS' progress, they have thus far failed to restore IS-controlled towns; IS is still on the offensive despite all of the incurred losses. Most of the violent clashes between the rebels and IS took place on June 5 in the village of al-Sheikh Rih near the Turkish border.

In light of IS’ attack on the northern countryside of Aleppo, rebels will seemingly fail to engage the regime in a battle in Aleppo. In this context, Col. Mohammed al-Ahmed, a spokesman for al-Jabha al-Shamiya, told Al-Monitor, “IS’ attack on Aleppo’s countryside will definitely delay the 'Conquest of Aleppo' battle, but the battle with the regime is well prepared, and even if it is delayed, it is bound to happen.”

ISIS

  #133  
29-06-2015, 00:09
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: 13.11.04
: 16,823
What if No One Is Winning the War in Syria?
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http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=60078



Posted by: ARON LUND
THURSDAY, MAY 28, 2015

Regardless of who is or is not losing the war in Syria, it is safe to say that no one seems to stand any chance of winning it. It is a lazy pattern of thought, but a strong one: wars are always discussed in terms of winners and losers, first shots and capitulations. But what this perspective misses is that many conflicts have no discernible end at all. They simply drag on until readers yawn and reporters leave, and go on to mutate into new forms, settling into spheres of influence and establishing stateless violence as the new normal.

The Syrian war may be one of these conflicts. With half of the population driven from their homes, the economy in irreparable ruin, multisided foreign intervention, and sectarianism at a fever pitch, neither President Bashar al-Assad nor any constellation of rebel groups seems able to put a country called Syria back together again.

IMPOSSIBLE END STATES
At this point, it is almost impossible to envision a realistic and stable (never mind democratic) end state dominated by one of the three major contenders for power in Syria.

The government keeps saying that Assad is winning. He is not, except maybe in the Charlie Sheen sense of the word. The Syrian ruler is now all stick and no carrot.
Even if we make the bold assumption that he can survive and stay in fighting shape for years to come, Assad does not seem to be either able or willing to engage in meaningful political compromise of the kind that could relegitimize his regime internationally and domestically. Nor does he have the resources to militarily overpower all of his enemies at once or buy back rebel towns with economic incentives. Unless he someday gets the requisite international backing to fully dominate the battlefield—which is unlikely—he’s not going to rule a united Syria ever again. And in the meantime, Assad’s refusal to step down or significantly compromise continues to drive many Syrians into the arms of the insurgency.

Because the Syrian regime suffers from dwindling resources and a severe manpower deficit, and Assad’s international allies are hurting from low global oil prices, the rebels could theoretically pull the rest of the state down if given enough foreign support. But they remain linked to extremist factions and divided to the point where they have no alternative government to offer—merely new forms of Islamist-dominated chaos—and are thus unlikely to ever get that support.

Additionally, the so-called Islamic State has proven itself able to expand in some areas of Syria even as it loses territory in Iraq, but the idea that it could establish a stable and viable dominion over the Levant is preposterous. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s pseudo-caliphate has only succeeded through the failure of its opponents. However much of a menace such a movement may be in a fractured war zone, the Islamic State remains manifestly unfit to rule a real country. Just like Assad and the rebels, the Islamic State can tear down others and act as a powerful spoiler, but it is unable to win in any meaningful sense of the word.

THE SOMALIZATION OF SYRIA

When the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi took over the job as United Nations and Arab League peace envoy in 2012, he warned of the “Somalization” of Syria.
The violent and well-deserved overthrow of longtime Somali dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991 was not followed by either democracy or a new dictatorship, but by permanent anarchy. A quarter of a century later, the international community has by and large written off Somalia as a lost cause—an ex-nation whose unfortunate citizens can expect nothing more from the world than the occasional military intervention to tamp down pirates and jihadi groups.

Unless a critical mass of actors can be made to accept some form of ceasefire or a patchwork of ceasefires, underwritten by God knows what political arrangement, this is also where Syria is headed. One faction or another may certainly gain the upper hand before splintering and starting all over again, and some warlords will be more powerful than others. Cities will be taken and retaken, and battles will be won and lost, until we all lose track. But you cannot win a war like Syria’s any more than you can win a plague or an earthquake.
  #198  
20-07-2015, 22:14
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: 13.11.04
: 16,823
Dozens of child soldiers recruited by Isil in Syria killed since the start of 2015
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...rt-of-2015.html

More than 50 child soldiers recruited by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) in Syria have been killed since the beginning of this year, a monitoring group said on Wednesday.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said it had documented the deaths of 52 child soldiers, all under the age of 16, who had been part of Isil's "Cubs of the Caliphate" program.
The programme provides intense military and religious training to children throughout Isil's areas of control in Syria, the Britain-based Observatory said.
As many as 31 were killed in July alone, in explosions, clashes, and air strikes by Syria's regime and the US-led coalition.
The child soldiers are used to man checkpoints or gather intelligence from areas outside Isil control, but Isil has been increasingly using them to execute prisoners or conduct suicide attacks.
So far this year, Isil has used 18 children as suicide bombers, most recently in its fight against Kurdish militia in northeastern Syria.
"This shows that Daesh is exploiting the suffering of the Syrian people," said Observatory head Rami Abdel Rahman, using the Arabic acronym for Isil.
"When a child reaches the point of becoming a suicide bomber, this means that he's been completely brainwashed," Mr Rahman told AFP.
The Observatory said it had received information on dozens more children killed, but that it could not confirm their deaths.
Since the beginning of 2015, Isil has recruited more than 1,100 children.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) also criticised the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which is fighting Isil in Syria, of failing to meet a commitment to stop using children in combat.
It said the YPG had demobilised some children since June 2014, but that it was still using both boys and girls under 18 as fighters.
"The YPG promised to stop sending children to war and it should carry out its promise," said Fred Abrahams, HRW special adviser.
"Of course the Kurdish forces are fighting groups like Isil that flout the laws of war, but that's no excuse to tolerate abuses by its own forces."
HRW said many armed groups in Syria were using child soldiers, but that it hoped the YPG would "do more to stop the practice".
Syria's conflict began in 2011 with anti-government protests, which degenerated into a civil war that has killed more than 230,000 people and forced millions to flee.
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