26-06-2008, 18:10
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חבר מתאריך: 19.09.05
הודעות: 1,280
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Firstly, I want to thank Yigil for sharing his very well written and informative work with us. It is an excellent combination of a strong historical knowledge with a sound analytic capability that succeeds in clearly explaining what had been previously a very confusing “new” buzzword. My thanks also go to all the other people in this discussion here who have shared their wisdom and insight. I have learned much. I really hope that officers in the army read and benefit from your articles.
After thinking about what was written here and using the swarming examples from the article, I have come to believe that the key in both the success and failure of the swarming tactics, lies mainly with the determination of the winning side.
In the cases of the US Paratroopers in Normandy and the Chechnyans in 94-96, their swarming tactics were successful because they acted skillfully and with great determination, while the other side reacted without sufficient determination or skill. The US paratroopers were well trained and very aggressive. The majority of the Checnyans may not have been well trained, but they were highly motivated and no less determined.
In the case of the general failure of VC attacks during Tet, it seems that the key is that here the “swarmers” were met by a well-skilled and determined force that was able to use their greater mobility and firepower to methodically destroy them. Another case is the generally unsuccessful Egyptian and Syrian Commando raids during 73 (other than on the Hermon where the Syrians had a great topographic advantage and over two weeks to prepare their defenses)
As a simple soldier in a reserve infantry battalion that participated (I specifically chose that word and not fought) in Lebanon2, I have long been puzzled by what went wrong and why we collectively failed to carry out the IDF’s mission of defending the State and People of Israel.
Was it fault of the new tactics?
Was it because we didn’t employ the old “classic” tactics?
The confused/changing orders?
Since the end of the war I have read countless interviews, articles and papers, internet discussions and even had an hour-long phone conversation with my poor battalion commander, but I am still not quite sure. Sure the Three Clowns share responsibility for lack of foresight and irresponsible decisions, and well-deserve their current career status, but I mean on the tactical level.
I think we failed primarily because the army chose not to make direct contact with the enemy. From the experience of my unit, and from what I read of others, it seems that there was no intent of simply closing with the enemy and destroying them.
Company-sized forces sat cooped up in houses with 2 or 3 soldiers looking out for signs of Hezbollah while the rest of the soldiers took turns sitting by windows to keep from being surprised. Not a bad employment for 6-man observation team but for three infantry companies? In the village of Yarun, after a few initial targets in the shmura 500m north of us were hit and the Hezbollah became aware of our presence (I assume since they shot a sagger at our house but missed), they decided not to cooperate anymore with our plan by simply leaving or hiding in bunkers. Who knows, we were never sent to search.
We stayed there for another two or three unproductive days. Finally, when guerilla movement was spotted in the center of the village, the battalion was ordered to… withdraw.
Despite the years of training neglect, I feel that most of the soldiers were strongly motivated and would have been willing to take the necessary risks if the command had shown the necessary determination and confidence. Had we actually attempted to make contact with the enemy, I think that we would have been successful and that our casualties would have been less then expected.
But the IDF lost confidence in its basic fighting skills, the Hezbollah were blown up to be super-commando fighters and the army seemed to want to avoid direct contact at all costs.
Bringing this long (and unfortunately in English) story to an end and tying it in with the original topic, I think that the historical examples prove that when a conventional force acts aggressively, in a determined and aggressive manner, employing its greater firepower and mobility, swarmming tactics have little chance for success.
BTW,
The counter-part of the “swarming” warfare tactics that the IDF so strongly embraced and misused, and which has also suffered from much scorn since the war, is of course the reliance on long range Standoff Firepower. For an excellent analysis of this subject I strongly recommend the following paper by Ron Tira, The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision http://www.tauac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo89.en.pdf
Also for an American perspective (although it relies on many well known Israeli sources and opinions) on the IDF’s performance in the war, see
We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by Matt M. Matthews http://usacac.armymil/CAC/csi/RandP/OP26.pdf .
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Sorry for the English... I was a bad student in Hebrew school
אבל אפשר לענות לי בעברית
נערך לאחרונה ע"י zragon13 בתאריך 26-06-2008 בשעה 18:14.
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