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16-03-2013, 22:32
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חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
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אנקדוטות מעניינות מתוך - Gulf of Conflict A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation
בתגובה להודעה מספר 1 שנכתבה על ידי nsdq160 שמתחילה ב "פעילות צבאית אמריקאית במפרץ הפרסי בתקופת מלחמת איראן עיראק"
Gulf of Conflict A History of U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/...tion_at_Sea.pdf
עבודה מצויינת עם כי לעתים המחבר מדלג בין קטעים ולאחר מכן חוזר אליהם, קצת מבלבל אבל קל לעקוב
U.S. Army Special Forces A-6 “Seabats” helicopters augmented the Navy’s regional helicopter fleet. Exceedingly quiet and designed to fly at night, the Seabats were outfitted with forward-looking infrared radar sensors, rockets, and 7.62-millimeter miniguns.
שימוש ב SR-71
SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft flew missions to provide photographic intelligence on Silkworm missile sites and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) bases
מדוע לא טובעה הזבלן?
The on-scene commander wanted to launch another air strike to finish off the Sabalan, a request that was relayed to Washington. When Defense Secretary Carlucci asked Admiral Crowe what he thought. Crowe responded, “Sir, I think we’ve shed enough blood today.” Carlucci agreed and the United States allowed the Sabalan to be towed back into port
The most substantial force available to combat the United States was the newly formed IRGCN. In July 1985, the IRGCN executed one of its first naval operations by seizing and briefly holding the Kuwaiti freighter al-Muharraq. The IRGCN quickly grew and by early 1987, became the primary means of attacking Gulf shipping. The backbone of the IRGCN was an improvised fleet of a hundred small boats, a combination of “Boston Whaler”–type boats and fast Swedish-built Boghammers.8 In 1984, over American objections, the Swedish government allowed the sale of nearly forty of these so-called cabin cruisers to Iran, and the IRGCN impressed every boat. However, the IRGCN did at least consider using swimmers to plant mines on the hulls of anchored U.S. warships, but Iran lacked both the trained personnel and the means to effectively deliver their swimmers to Bahrain
על פעילות המיקוש הימי
In August 1984, a Libyan ship laid mines in the Red Sea, playing havoc with Western shipping in the Suez Canal. Although U.S. intelligence soon uncovered Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi’s culpability, the incident remained mysterious enough that Libya suffered no consequences from its mining of international waters. Such plausible deniability afforded by naval mines strongly appealed to the Iranian leadership: It provided a low-risk means of striking at the United States and ran a minimal risk of retaliation. Unless an Iranian vessel was caught in the act of laying mines, Iranian officials believed, it would be difficult for Washington to justify a military response. In 1981, in order to blockade Iraq, the Islamic Republic purchased stocks of two different types of unsophisticated moored contact mines from North Korea: the small Myam (SADAF-01) mine with only a forty-four-pound explosive charge and the much larger M-08 (SADAF-02). The latter was a pre–World War I, Russian-designed mine, packing an explosive charge of nearly 250 pounds. Neither mine could be used in deep water, such as the Strait of Hormuz, but both could be laid throughout the shallower Arab side of the Persian Gulf. The IRGC reverse-engineered the North Korean mines and began producing an Iranian version of these two mines. By July 1985, the first of the Iranian-designated SADAF-01 and SADAF-02 mines began rolling off the production lines at an ammunition plant north of Tehran; about twenty SADAFs were produced each week. The two forces operated from some of the same bases, particularly Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, but the IRGCN maintained a parallel and independent commands. Yet it also served as somewhat of a check against an IRIN whose many officers still harbored affection for their former ally, the United States. As a result, Tehran began to rely more on the IRGCN, which rapidly became the more powerful of the two navies
לגבי יום הקרב עצמו
Rather than wait until all his ships were ready and able to be sent out en masse, Captain Yeganeh ordered each to move as it became available. What small chance of success Iran had evaporated as the Iranian fleet sortied piecemeal from Bandar Abbas, and the vastly superior U.S. forces dealt with each in turn. When Iranian air search radar detected a U.S. F-14 fighter only twelve miles from Iranian airspace, the IRIAF commander believed this was yet another provocative move and ordered his aircraft aloft to chase the U.S. plane away. Only five of his eleven F-4 fighters were functional, and his entire command was distracted by grief, having lost a number of airmen in a C-130 crash three days before.
Senior U.S. commanders were greatly impressed by the courage of Commander Mallek in steaming his tiny missile boat directly toward a vastly superior U.S. force, including a cruiser thirty times the Joshan’s size. The Sahand commanding officer displayed equal aggressiveness—as did the Sabalan’s skipper, who headed out when ordered despite almost certainly knowing the fate that had befallen his sister ship a few hours earlier.
The IRGCN had amassed more than sixty small boats at Abu Musa Island before Operation Praying Mantis. It intended to conduct a mass attack against both the UAE and the U.S. Navy, but it managed to conduct one small attack. After U.S. aircraft sank one of its boats, the remainder were beached, while the other IRGCN boats remained safely at pier for the duration of the fight. Several C-130s were outfitted with signals intelligence collection equipment before the fall of the shah, and they proved useful in monitoring U.S. and Iraqi ground and air forces and in ascertaining port destinations of neutral ships, relaying this information to the naval district headquarters
Despite CENTCOM’s fears of large-scale IRGCN “swarming” attacks against U.S. warships, the IRGCN attempted this on only two occasions. One was during Operation Praying Mantis, when Iran amassed nearly fifty small boats at Abu Musa Island. Despite this impressive congregation, during the day’s fighting the IRGCN attempted only two attacks using fewer than five boats; after U.S. aircraft sank one Boghammer, the boats remained safely ashore. Iranian officials correctly observed that during Operation Praying Mantis, a lone missile from the Joshan had nearly knocked out the largest U.S. warship in the Persian Gulf.
הטילים הסינים
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Iran purchased advanced Chinese-made C-801/802 antiship missiles for both its surface fleet and coastal defense forces. Originally based on the French-made Exocet, the C-801/802s are far less susceptible to jamming and, with a sixty-seven-nautical-mile range, can reach most of the Persian Gulf tanker routes. The coastal defense variant represents a major improvement over the older Silkworm missiles poised at U.S. forces during Operation Earnest Will. Rather than operating from fixed sites, they are mobile, truck-mounted, and guided by mobile radar stations. They require far less time to set up for launching, which decreases the amount of warning time of an impending launch. Recently, Iran has fielded its own newer missile, the Noor. Produced under license, it is an upgraded Chinese C-802, which is far less susceptible to electronic countermeasures such as those that diverted the Joshan’s Harpoon missile twenty years ago.
איך השפיע יום הקרב על החשיבה,האסט' והסד"כ הימיים האירנים ב 20 השנים שלאחר מכן?
Operation Earnst Will profoundly influenced the Iranian military and its military planning for a future conflict with the United States. Tehran came away from the confrontations with the United States in the 1980s convinced that Iran’s strategic and tactical approach had been sound, but that its operations had been technologically flawed. As a result, the Iranian regular navy’s large-combatant surface fleet remains largely unchanged since 1988, save upgrading its armament with the Chinese missiles. In 1999, Iran began building the 1,400-ton Mowjclass frigate, essentially an improved version of its Vosper-class frigates. The weapons capabilities of these two classes of ships are much the same, except that the newer frigates are sturdier, better constructed ships (most likely because of the experience with the Sabalan). However, it took eight years for the first ship to become operational, and while a second is under construction, production is proceeding at a glacial pace. These ships appear to be replacements for the aging British frigates rather than an augmentation of their conventional fleet.
To be sure, Tehran’s priority in naval forces now is in submarines and missile boats. All carry enough missiles or torpedoes to sink any U.S. warship, and all have a greater capability of evading detection. The three Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia in the 1990s are being augmented by the Ghadir class of Iranian-built midget submarines. Relying on the perceived near-success of the Joshan during Operation Praying Mantis, the IRIN embarked on building its own version of the Kaman-class missile boats. Four have been commissioned since 2003, including one renamed the Joshan. All carry C-802 missiles
The IRGCN operates ten Houdong missile boats, each carrying four C-802 missiles. Around three hundred boats are actively manned, but hundreds more are laid up in warehouses, capable of being outfitted on short notice. The intent seems to be to mimic their covert mining tactics of blending in with normal commercial traffic to deploy underwater saboteurs close to U.S. warships or Gulf harbors. More recently, Iran has experimented with two submersible swimmer-delivery vehicles. While most of the stock is SADAF-01 and SADAF-02 mines, Tehran has invested in several hundred bottom-laid influence mines, which use sensors to detect the presence of a vessel and detonate when the vessel comes within blast range.
Covert mining is a prime mission for the smaller Ghadir-class submarines, but it is likely a secondary mission for the larger IRIN-manned Kilo-class submarines, which can hold two dozen mines. On Abu Musa, the IRGCN has expanded the runway and has stored upwards of sixty to ninety days worth of munitions; it may have as many as five thousand troops on these islands alone. Should the United States attack again, it will take far more firepower to neutralize these nodes. Since 1988, Iran has improved its radar coverage by erecting a string of coastal radars along its shores. Although some Iranian leaders advocate such a massive response, perhaps just to derail any reconciliation efforts, Tehran realizes that the likelihood of its long term success is minimal: Any attempt to close the Strait would be met by a united coalition force. The IRIAF remains vastly inferior to its U.S. counterpart, and Iranian submarines and missile boats, although they might achieve an initial tactical surprise around the confined Strait of Hormuz, could not withstand the onslaught of a U.S.-led counterattack. Iran’s Kilos and Ghadir class midget submarines would be dispatched easily in the littoral waters. In previous engagements with Libya and Iran, missile boats have not proved particularly effective against the U.S. Navy’s airpower. Even within the confines of the Gulf, superior targeting capabilities enable U.S. combatants to engage with standoff missiles before the Iranian missile boats can even target the U.S. warships. A large-scale engagement would have to be seen as a last resort, perhaps if the regime itself were threatened.
In all likelihood, Tehran’s military strategy to control this vital waterway rests on a layered defense scheme, first developed during Operation Earnest Will. In such a scheme, Iran would lay large minefields of moored contact mines to the west of the Strait of Hormuz, with hidden lanes to permit its own ships’ movement. These mines would be reinforced by the more sophisticated influence mines, which would be placed around the deep-water channel. These minefields would be covered by fire from multiple land-based surface-to-surface missiles that ring the Strait The Joint Staff of the Armed Forces understands this problem and attempted to integrate the two forces. In 2000, Tehran established a joint headquarters around the Strait of Hormuz, where both navies operate, by combining the First Naval District headquarters of the IRGCN and IRIN; this operational consolidation may have been duplicated in other districts as well. In the event of war, the IRGCN commander assumes overall command. Iran has tried to prepare this joint headquarters, holding a massive exercise in November 2008 that involved more than thirty-five ships and submarines from both the regular navy and the IRGCN. However, the fact that the joint naval command is activated only during wartime limits its potential.
The current IRIN commander, Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, and his immediate predecessor are the first admirals in two decades to come from the regular navy’s officer corps, perhaps an indicator that the regime believes the regular navy is now politically dependable In recent years, both the IRGCN and regular navy have constructed an array of underground command centers to control both fleet and coastal defense missile operations, hoping these will prove more resistant to U.S. air strike. The senior IRGCN commander in the northern Gulf, Capt. Abol Qasem Amangah, was credited in an Iranian newspaper with seizing the British sailors and marines. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, Amangah displays the characteristics prized by the IRGC: aggressiveness, initiative, and independent action. Apparently without orders from headquarters, he decided to hold the British servicemen, calculating that the United Kingdom would not resist and knowing that his actions—if successful—would be rewarded by Tehran. His motivation appears to have been to demonstrate Iranian dominance of the waterway and to push back against the coalition, which had been increasingly encroaching on the boundary claimed by Iran. He may also have wanted to disrupt the coalition’s anti-smuggling campaign as the IRGC has been known to profit from the black market.
Captain Amangah’s calculations proved correct on all scores. The fourteen British servicemen and one woman were transferred to Tehran, where they were interrogated and held for fifteen days before being released by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. It was a national embarrassment for the British government, the coalition stopped operations close to the contested boundary, and Captain Amangah received a medal.
The IRGCN has repeatedly displayed this modus operandi, conducting itself with volatility and aggression. It routinely monitors ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, often shadowing U.S. warships, which has resulted in a number of near engagements with the U.S. Navy. In June 1995 and again in December 2000, a large collection of IRGCN small boats approached U.S. aircraft carriers transiting through the Strait. In the later incident, forty boats closed on the USS Lincoln, uncomfortably close for the U.S. Fifth Fleet just three months after the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. More recently, the IRGCN has become more truculent. In April 2006, an IRGCN Houdong missile boat tried to close on the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, until an escorting cruiser forced the Iranian boat to turn back. The following year, two Iranian Boghammers near Farsi Island again closed on an American carrier, forcing a U.S. F-18 aircraft to conduct a low flyover to warn them away. In December 2008, the USS Whidbey Island fired warning shots at yet another
כיצד השתנה המצב מבחינת ארה"ב ובעלות בריתה ב 20 השנים שחלפו מאז האירועים (המאמר נכתב ב 2009)?
Nevertheless, there are a number of key differences between the 1980s and today in the Persian Gulf, generally favoring the United States. U.S. military power in the Gulf far exceeds that deployed twenty years ago. Whereas the United States could not get combat aircraft into Saudi Arabia or Bahrain to support Operation Earnest Will, today U.S. Air Force combat aircraft are positioned in five GCC countries plus Iraq. Multiple U.S. Navy carriers are now a fixture in Gulf waters. Today, the logistical infrastructure to support U.S. forces is extensive. The U.S. Fifth Fleet controls more warships today than at the height of Operation Earnest Will. Even in countermine operations the United States is better positioned today; the U.S. Navy learned its lesson in this instance and maintains four countermine ships in Bahrain.
The most dramatic difference is in coalition support. During the 1980s, the United States acted unilaterally. Although European nations did dispatch seven countermine vessels to the Gulf, they operated independently of CENTCOM. Coalition command arrangements were ad hoc with respect to U.S. participation. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, coalition naval. Strong countermine capabilities need to be maintained in the Gulf. The United States and its allies in Europe need to maintain robust countermine capabilities within the Gulf, positioned to respond quickly to any attempt to disrupt oil exports by Iranian mining. The United States currently has four countermine vessels stationed in the Gulf. This is enough to address any initial contingency, but during Operation Earnest Will, seventeen coalition countermine vessels were required to maintain the safety of the tanker routes. Getting these assets to the Persian Gulf takes time: Piggybacking on super transport ships would take thirty days. If the countermine vessels were to go by their own power, it would take at least sixty days
בסיסים צפים
Floating patrol bases, which are currently used to safeguard Iraqi offshore oil platforms, would provide a cost- effective system by which to monitor IRGCN activity. Manned by Marines and SEALs, and equipped with helicopters, they could provide the needed presence and deterrence to thwart Iranian small-boat or mining operations. Three Mobile Sea Bases could be deployed opposite the major bases of the IRGCN: one in the northern Gulf, another near Farsi Island, and a third close to Abu Musa Island in the southern Gulf. Similar U.S. forces, especially helicopters, could be staged out of Oman to safeguard the Strait of Hormuz.
7. Coalition support to counter Iran is critical.
Two years of Operation Earnest Will convoys strained the U.S. Navy twenty years ago. Today, the United States has only about two-thirds the number of ships it had during the 1980s. Smaller ships, including European and Australian frigates, would be needed for any prolonged convoy operations. The command relationship under CFMCC exists to conduct these operations, much in the same way operations have recently been expanded for antipiracy operations off Somalia. The United States needs to make the case with its naval allies that any Iranian attempt to mine international waters or threaten oil shipments.
כיצד שקלו האמריקנים להרחיב את המבצע לו נדרשו לכך? - מעניין מאד
During Operation Earnest Will, CENTCOM developed a series of scaled military options. The commander, Gen. George Crist, recommended as a first option attacking targets that facilitated Iran’s ability to sustain its operations in the Gulf. He proposed seizing one or all of the islands of Farsi, Sirri, or Abu Musa, as well as destroying the oil platforms Iran used to collect intelligence and command the IRGCN. In a memo for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the CENTCOM commander said he wanted to “deny their eyes and forward staging bases within the Gulf”. First on the target list were the Silkworm missile storage sites and Iranian intelligence sites. Other strike packages included Bandar Abbas (to destroy IRIN and IRGC forces). Fourteen B-52s with a mixed load, including precision-guided cruise missiles, would knock out the hard-to-reach targets, such as the Bandar Abbas air defense headquarters and the First Naval District Headquarters building, while others would attack the Bandar Abbas Naval Base. Simultaneously, U.S. Navy aircraft and F-16s based in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia would strike the air defense headquarters and destroy Iranian surface-to-air Hawk missiles that ring Bandar Abbas airport, which, in addition to being a commercial airport, was the main southern airfield for IRIAF and its complement of F-4 fighters. The validity of this concept was never tested, but based upon historical patterns of Iranian behavior, it was a sound approach to moderate Iranian actions while avoiding a wider war |
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