23-07-2008, 17:24
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חבר מתאריך: 08.11.04
הודעות: 21,076
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אין פה צדדים חיובים 
ציטוט:
Users unable to modify software
A user who wanted to switch to a competing program might find that it would be impossible
for that new program to read old data, as the information would be "locked in" to the old program.
It could also make it impossible for the user to read or modify their data except
as specifically permitted by the software.
Remote attestation could cause other problems. Currently web sites can be visited
using a number of web browsers, though certain websites may be formatted such that
some browsers cannot decipher their code. Some browsers have found a way to get around
that problem by emulating other browsers. With remote attestation a website could check
the internet browser being used and refuse to display on any browser other than the specified
one (like Internet Explorer), so even emulating the browser would not work.
Users have no control over data
Sealed storage could prevent users from moving sealed files to the new computer.
This limitation might exist either through poor software design or deliberate limitations
placed by publishers of works. The migration section of the TPM specification requires
that it be impossible to move certain kinds of files except to a computer with the
identical make and model of security chip.
Users unable to override
Some opponents of Trusted Computing advocate allowing owner overrides to allow the computer
to use the secure I/O path to make sure the owner is physically present,
to then bypass restrictions. Such an override would allow remote attestation to a user's specification,
e.g., to create certificates that say Internet Explorer is running, even if a different browser is used.
Instead of preventing software change, remote attestation would indicate when the software
has been changed without owner's permission.
Trusted Computing Group members have refused to implement owner override.[17] Proponents of
trusted computing believe that Owner override defeats the trust in other computers
since remote attestation can be forged by the owner. Owner override offers the security
and enforcement benefits to a machine owner, but does not allow him to trust other computers,
because their owners could waive rules or restrictions on their own computers.
Under this scenario, once data is sent to someone else's computer, whether it be a diary,
a DRM music file, or a joint project, that other person controls what security, if any,
their computer will enforce on their copy of those data. This has the potential to undermine
the applications of trusted computing to enforce Digital Rights Management,
control cheating in online games and attest to remote computations for grid computing.
Loss of anonymity
Because a Trusted Computing equipped computer is able to uniquely attest to its own identity,
it will be possible for vendors and others who possess the ability to use the attestation feature
to zero in on the identity of the user of TC-enabled software with a high degree of certainty.
Such a capability is contingent on the reasonable chance that the user at some time provides
user-identifying information, whether voluntarily or indirectly. One common way that information
can be obtained and linked is when a user registers a computer just after purchase.
Another common way is when a user provides identifying information to the website
of an affiliate of the vendor.
While proponents of TC point out that online purchases and credit transactions could potentially
be more secure as a result of the remote attestation capability, this may cause the computer user
to lose expectations of anonymity when using the Internet.
Critics point out that this could have a chilling effect on political free speech, the ability of
journalists to use anonymous sources, whistle blowing, political blogging and other areas
where the public needs protection from retaliation through anonymity.
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נערך לאחרונה ע"י Lance בתאריך 23-07-2008 בשעה 17:26.
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