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  #7  
ישן 20-06-2006, 13:58
  משתמש זכר Soloavia Soloavia אינו מחובר  
צחי בן עמי לתחום התעופה הצבאית, חיל האויר ותולדותיו
 
חבר מתאריך: 17.10.04
הודעות: 8,704
במטוס היה צוות של 7 איש - הסיבה - הזדקרות בפניה
בתגובה להודעה מספר 6 שנכתבה על ידי סירפד שמתחילה ב "B-52"

On the 24th of June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched at approximate 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The aircrew had the planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end of the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a "go-around" or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At mid-field, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing and crashed. Impact occurred at approximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors out of a crew of four field grade officers. 3






Killed in the crash were Lt Col Arthur "Bud" Holland, the Chief of the 92d Bomb Wing Standardization and Evaluation branch. Lt Col Holland, an instructor pilot, was designated as the aircraft commander and was undoubtedly flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. 4 The copilot was Lt Col Mark McGeehan, also an instructor pilot and the 325th Bomb Squadron (BMS) Commander. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests considerable animosity existed between the two pilots who were at the controls of Czar 52..






This was a result of Lt Col McGeehan's unsuccessful efforts to have Bud Holland "grounded" for what he perceived as numerous and flagrant violations of air discipline while flying with 325th BMS aircrews. Colonel Robert Wolff was the Vice Wing Commander and was added to the flying schedule as a safety observer by Col Brooks, the Wing Commander, on the morning of the mishap. This was to be Col Wolff's "fini flight," an Air Force tradition where an aviator is hosed down following his last flight in an aircraft. Upon landing, Col Wolff was to be met on the flightline by his wife and friends for a champagne toast to a successful flying career. The radar navigator position was filled by Lt Col Ken Huston, the 325th BMS Operations Officer.






While all aircraft accidents that result in loss of life are tragic, those that could have been prevented are especially so. The crash of Czar 52 was primarily the result of actions taken by a singularly outstanding "stick and rudder pilot," but one who, ironically, practiced incredibly poor airmanship. The distinction between these two similar sounding roles will be made clear as we progress in this analysis. Of equal or greater significance, was the fact that supervision and leadership facilitated the accident through failed policies of selective enforcement of regulations, as well as failing to heed the desperate warning signals raised by peers and subordinates over a period of three years prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, there was considerable evidence of Lt Col Holland's poor airmanship spanning a period of over three years.

_____________________________________
ילדים: קל לייצר - קשה לתחזק


נערך לאחרונה ע"י Soloavia בתאריך 20-06-2006 בשעה 14:04.
תגובה ללא ציטוט תגובה עם ציטוט חזרה לפורום
  #9  
ישן 20-06-2006, 15:46
  משתמש זכר Soloavia Soloavia אינו מחובר  
צחי בן עמי לתחום התעופה הצבאית, חיל האויר ותולדותיו
 
חבר מתאריך: 17.10.04
הודעות: 8,704
ישנם מאמרים נוספים על המקרה הזה שהיה בוטה במיוחד
בתגובה להודעה מספר 8 שנכתבה על ידי Fox450 שמתחילה ב "מאמר מרתק"

תיקון טעות : במטוס היו 4 אנשים ולא 7 כמו שכתבתי קודם

הטייס נחשב למסוכן ביתר, ואנשים חששו לטוס איתו.

כמעט בכל טיסה חרג מנהלים, שלושה חודשים קודם לכן - טייס המשנה נאלץ לחטוף את ההגאים (בעצם להשתלט על ההטסה באצעות ההגאים שלו) כדי למשוך על מנת שלא להיכנס ברכס.

בפעם אחרת טס בגובה 50 רגל (כ-20 מטרים מעפ"ש) ופעמיים נדרשה התערבות טייס המשנה על מנת למנוע פגיעת המטוס בקרקע.

מפקד הטייסת המליץ למפקד הכנף לקרקע את הטייס מסיבות בטיחו, אך לא נענה. מפקד הטייסת הודיע כי לא יאפשר לטייסים אחרים לטוס עם הטייס עקב חוסר משמעת אווירית.

טייסים אחרים פנו אף הם אל מפקד הכנף באשר לאופן ההטסה של אותו טייס.

מפקד הכנף וסגנו נשפטו לאחר שהתברר שהטייס עידכן אותם לגבי הטיסה שתכנן במפגן, וחריגות הבטיחות שבה, והם אישרו אותה.

במפשט הצבאי הודה מפקד הכנף בהתרשלות בתפקידו.

5 ימים לפני האסון - נהרגו בבסיס 5 אנשים מפליטת צרור באחד המטוסים...

ראה כאן:
http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache...en&ct=clnk&cd=1
_____________________________________
ילדים: קל לייצר - קשה לתחזק


נערך לאחרונה ע"י Soloavia בתאריך 20-06-2006 בשעה 15:57.
תגובה ללא ציטוט תגובה עם ציטוט חזרה לפורום
  #11  
ישן 20-06-2006, 14:45
  משתמש זכר Soloavia Soloavia אינו מחובר  
צחי בן עמי לתחום התעופה הצבאית, חיל האויר ותולדותיו
 
חבר מתאריך: 17.10.04
הודעות: 8,704
מסקנות סופיות בחקירת NTSB
בתגובה להודעה מספר 10 שנכתבה על ידי סירפד שמתחילה ב "הקטע הלפני-אחרון"

UPDATE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF FIREFIGHTING AIRPLANE CRASHES IN


WALKER, CALIFORNIA AND ESTES PARK, COLORADO [related photos, below]



The National Transportation Safety Board today released the following updated information on its investigations of two United States Department of Agriculture Forestry Service firefighting airplane crashes: Lockheed C130A at Walker, California on June 17, 2002; Consolidated-Vultee P4Y-2 at Estes Park, Colorado on July 18, 2002. Both aircraft were registered to Hawkins and Powers, Aviation, Inc., in Greybull, Wyoming.

On June 17, 2002 a Lockheed C-130A, N130HP, broke apart in flight while executing a fire retardant delivery near Walker, California. The three flight crewmembers were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture - Forestry Service for the public-use firefighting flight under 14 CFR Part 91. A company flight plan had been filed and visual meteorological conditions prevailed.

The airplane had departed Minden, Nevada, about 2:29 p.m., to participate in firefighting efforts near Walker. During the retardant drop the airplane's wings folded upwards at the center wing-to-fuselage attachment point and separated. The right wing folded just before the left wing. The crash occurred at about 2:45 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time.

The aircraft was delivered to the Air Force in 1957 and acquired by the U.S. Forest Service in 1988. At the time of the accident the aircraft had accumulated about 21,863 flight hours.

The second accident occurred on July 18, 2002, at 6:40 p.m. Mountain Daylight Time, when a Consolidated-Vultee P4Y-2, N7620C, operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture - Forestry Service was destroyed upon impact into mountainous terrain near Estes Park, Colorado. A post-crash fire ensued. Prior to the impact, the airplane's left wing failed just inboard of engine number two. The left wing fractured at its wing-to-fuselage attachment point along the lower left spar cap.

At the time of the failure the aircraft was making a 15-20 degree left bank, preparing to drop retardant on a forest fire burning northwest of Lyons, Colorado. The 2 crewmembers on board the airplane were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The public use flight originated in Bloomfield, Colorado and was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 137, aerial application. No flight plan was filed.

The P4Y was manufactured in 1944 and was used first by the Navy and then transferred to the Coast Guard prior to Hawkins and Powers acquiring it in 1969. Total flight hours are unknown but from 1969 to the time of the accident the aircraft had accumulated 8,200 flight hours.

Fatigue cracks were found in pieces of wing structure in both the C130A and the P4Y airplanes. Both investigations are closely looking at the fatigue cracks as well as other safety issues, such as inspection and maintenance procedures and operational factors. In both investigations, the Safety Board is collecting data to determine why the cracks initiated and propagated to the critical length that caused the wings to fail catastrophically.

Although metallurgical examinations of both aircraft are ongoing the preliminary results for both have indicated that widespread fatigue was not evident over the entire wing. The Safety Board and the FAA are evaluating current crack detection techniques to determine their reliability.

The Safety Board is working with the United States Air Force, Lockheed, Hawkins and Powers, and the Forest Service to review pertinent inspection and maintenance performed on the wings' structures throughout their service history. The Safety Board is monitoring the efforts of the FAA and industry representatives to develop appropriate and effective inspection and maintenance requirements to address critical fatigue areas.

Although initial performance calculations for the C130A's flight have been completed, additional information on fuel weights and gust load factors is still being refined in order to get a more accurate depiction of the loads the airplane experienced during the accident sequence.

During a C-130A contract pre-award evaluation in 1991, the Department of the Interior's (DOI) Office of Aviation Services inspectors concluded that essential inspection and maintenance services critical to sustaining the airplane in an airworthy condition under normal operating conditions were not being accomplished with the C130A. This prompted the DOI, in 1993, to prohibit the use of the C130A on DOI land. The FAA and the DOI subsequently developed an action plan to address many of the same inspection and maintenance issues seen in the most recent C130A and P4Y accident investigations. Since that time the DOI has dropped its restrictions on the C130A and the Safety Board is investigating how the FAA and the DOI followed through with the proposed action plan and what corrective measures were put in place.

Based on this information, the Safety Board will explore whether the C130A and P4Y events were unique or a sign of systemic problems with military surplus aircraft now in public use operations. The investigations are reviewing continuing airworthiness issues including the original design intent, engineering support, mission profile, operating limits, inspection intervals and techniques and life limits of both these surplus military airplanes and relating that to the current mission for which the Forest Service is using them to determine if the airplanes' design and operational limits are appropriate for its current intended use.
http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2002/020924.htm


תוספות ותמונה של "לפני":
http://aviation-safety.net/photos/d...0&vnr=2&kind=PC
_____________________________________
ילדים: קל לייצר - קשה לתחזק


נערך לאחרונה ע"י Soloavia בתאריך 20-06-2006 בשעה 14:47.
תגובה ללא ציטוט תגובה עם ציטוט חזרה לפורום
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