|
08-01-2013, 18:52
|
|
|
חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
|
|
אם כבר בספינות אוויר עסקינן - דו"ח חדש של ה GAO על פרויקטי ספינות אוויר
בתגובה להודעה מספר 1 שנכתבה על ידי איזמל שמתחילה ב "ספינת האוויר שמובילה פי 3 משקל מכל מטוס תובלה -מדהים לא ?"
Future Aerostat and Airship Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and Coordination Needs
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649661.pdf
We identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or had been initiated since 2007, and DOD had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. For example, the Army oversees and manages the GARP testbed, JLENS, LEMV, and some high altitude airship efforts; the Air Force manages TARS; DARPA and the Air Force are responsible for ISIS; the Navy undertook Star Light and is currently responsible for PGSS and AAFL; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is responsible for Project Pelican.Over the past 6 years, overall total DOD investment in aerostat and airship development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance has increased, ranging from about $339 million in fiscal year 2007 to a high of about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2010, and about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012. DOD has invested almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012 on key aerostat and airship efforts in our review. Moreover, aerostat-related investment—$5.8 billion—accounted for more than 80 percent of the total.
Since 1978, DOD has operated aerostats along the southern U.S. border for counterdrug detection and monitoring. Several factors have increased DOD’s attention toward LTA platforms. The lack of enemy air defense capabilities in recent military operations has made threats to LTA platforms appear to be low, and the military’s demand for persistent ISR has grown significantly. For example, DOD plans to almost double the number of aerostats—from 66 to 125—in Afghanistan for ISR in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.
איך אפשר בלי
Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical challenges, leading to cost overruns and schedule delays. Additionally, DOD used the rapid acquisition process to acquire airships that had high technical risks. We found that DOD used its rapid acquisition process to initiate two airship efforts to quickly deliver warfighter capabilities, but significantly
underestimated the risks of meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.
The Army initiated JLENS system development in August 2005. JLENS consists of two large aerostats—over 240 feet in length—each with a 7,000 pound payload capacity for cruise missile detection and tracking. JLENS was originally scheduled to enter production in September 2010. However, that same month, an aerostat accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS platforms. The accident, as well as recent system integration challenges, led to a decision to not procure production units. the program
previously planned to procure 16 aerostats. Now, the program is scheduled to only acquire 2 aerostats using research and development funding, and is not expected to enter the production phase
ISIS is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force science and technology effort initiated by DARPA in 2004. ISIS is to develop and demonstrate a radar sensor system that is fully integrated into a stratospheric airship measuring 510 feet in length and with a payload capacity of 6,600 pounds. ISIS has
experienced technical challenges stemming from subsystem development and radar antennae panel manufacturing. Consequently, earlier this year DARPA temporarily delayed airframe development activities, and instead will mainly focus on radar risk reduction activities.
The Army initiated development efforts on LEMV in 2010. At over 300 feet in length and with a goal of carrying a 2,500 pound payload, LEMV offers substantive potential ISR capabilities—if the program can meet its performance objectives. LEMV’s deployment is behind schedule by at least 10 months (about a 56 percent schedule increase) due to issues with fabric production, getting foreign parts cleared through customs, adverse weather conditions causing the evacuation of work crews, and first-time integration and testing issues. Also, LEMV is about 12,000 pounds overweight because components, such as tail fins, exceed weight thresholds. According to program officials, the increased
weight reduces the airship’s estimated on-station endurance at an altitude of 20,000 feet from the required 21 days, to 4 to 5 days. The Army successfully launched and recovered LEMV during its first flight in August 2012.
The Air Force initiated development efforts on Blue Devil Block 2 in 2010. Much like LEMV, this effort was to deliver a large airship that would carry a 2,500 pound payload in support of the ISR mission. The length of the airship was 370 feet. Prior to its termination in June 2012, the Blue Devil Block 2 airship effort experienced significant technical problems resulting in cost overruns and schedule delays. According to an Air Force official, the Blue Devil Block 2 development effort had a very aggressive development schedule because it was intended to meet an urgent need for use in Afghanistan. The Air Force terminated the Blue Devil Block 2 airship effort in June 2012 due to the technical problems experienced with the airframe and the need to avoid substantially increasing costs of the effort
ה GAO מזהה כפילות מיותרת בין הפרויקטים (או לפחות כזו שהתקיימה עד לביטול הבלו-דוויל)
The shortcomings in planning, insight, and collaboration may have made some airship efforts susceptible to duplication. We identified two airship development efforts—LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2—that were potentially duplicative at the time of our review. Most of the desired capabilities for LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 were similar, as shown in table 3. The two airship efforts also were being developed concurrently and were expected to be deployed to Afghanistan for testing and operations around the same time
בסוף המסמך יש תיאור מפורט של כל אחת מ 15 התוכניות השונות וכן דוגמאות לפרויקטים ממשלתיים-אזרחיים מקבילים
דף יצרן ה BLUE DEVIL (אגב מנכ"ל החברה הוא דיויד דפטולה, גנרל 3 כוכבים בדימוס בתפקידו האחרון רלמד"ן חהא"א ש 21 שנה קודם לכן כסא"ל היה מתכנן ראשי של פעילות חהא"א במלחמת המפרץ הראשונה)
http://www.mav6.com/Mav6-Blue-Devil-Airship.pdf
JLENS: Co-ordinating Cruise Missile Defense – And More
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...and-more-02921/
דף יצרן ה JLENS - חברת לוקהיד מרטין
http://www.raytheon.com/businesses/..._defense/jlens/
http://www.raytheon.com/businesses/...s_jlens_pdf.pdf
העדכון האחרון לגבי JLENS הוא ששני אבות הטיפוס והמפעילים שכבר הוכשרו על ידי צבא ארה"ב ממתינים שהפנטגון ישחרר 40 מיליון דולר (שכבר אושרו בקונגרס) לטובת ניסוי כלים מבצעי במפרץ הפרסי אך הפנטגון משהה את ההחלטה ויש החוששים לגורל הפרויקט כתוצאה מכך.
Move JLENS Forward
http://www.defensenews.com/article/...e-JLENS-Forward
ותגובת הנגד היח"צנית של לוקהיד מרטין - מתגאה בכך שיציר כפיה המתקדם יהיה רכיב משמעותי ביכולתו של הצי האמריקני לזהות בזמן בין היתר ולהדוף התקפות SWARMING של האירנים במפרץ הפרסי.
JLENS simultaneously tracks swarming boats, cars, aircraft
http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2235
ניסוי שבוצע על ידי מהגנ"א של צבא ארה"ב באפריל 2012 במסגרתו יירטו טילי פטריוט טילי שיוט שזוהו על ידי הבלון
Patriot PAC-3 Assisted by JLENS, Successfully Intercept a Cruise Missile Target
http://defense-update.com/20120426_...ile-target.html
אפרופו לוקהיד מרטין, היא גם הקבלן המבצע (או יותר נכון לשעבר) של פרויקט ISIS
Lockheed wins ISIS airship contract from DARPA
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...m-darpa-325714/
דף ה DARPA על הפרויקט
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/STO/Programs/Integrated_Sensor_is_Structure_(ISIS).aspx
לגבי ה LEMV של נורתרופ-גרומן
Army’s Giant Spy Blimp Plan for Afghanistan Set Adrift
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/blimp/
Rise of the “Blimps”: The US Army’s LEMV
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...mys-LEMV-06438/
על הכפילות בינן ה LEMV ל BLUE DEVIL של MAV6
Giant Spy Blimp Battle Could Decide Surveillance’s Future
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/201...y-blimp-battle/
|
|