Between others, Okasha said:
- Moubarak cancelled the second wave of the opening strike.
- This wave was to be flown in order to provide protection for a large-scale heliborne commando-assault, designed to postpone the deployment of Israeli reserves towards the Suez.
- Because the second wave was not flown, a large number of helicopters was shot down by the Israelis.
Asked whether this was deliberate or a mistake, Okasha said he did not know, but he was sure it was a wrong decision. Helicopters carrying hundreds of troops required protection.
Asked about the aim of the 2nd wave, Okasha explained that the EAF fighters were to hit the same targets again, and this would be enough to protect the helicopters. The explanation "from above" was that the I wave achieved its goals, and thus the helicopters went out without protection. Instead of discussing this wrong decision, after the war Moubarak was made a hero, associated with the success of the 14 October's Battle of Mansoura as if this was solely his own achievement.
Okasha further described Moubarak as a good pilot, working tirelessly, but particularly excelling at administrative work and studies, and running the Air Force Academy for four terms. In his opinion, it was good for Egypt that there were people like him, with efficiency and ability to "plan and arrange everything". However, beyond that, Moubarak was not really good for anyting else. On the contrary, Okasha mentioned brigade- and squadron commanders like Barakat, Mannawy, or Saima (an ex-RJAF pilot who defected to Egypt flying a Hunter, in 1962), Manawy and many others.
He said Moubarak had a "lucky" day after 1967. Following that war he was sent with all the other Egyptian Tupolev crews to Iraq, to continue training there (Egypt lost all of its Tu-16s in June 1967, and thus these crews were sent to Iraq to keep on training on Iraqi Tu-16s). While there, many of officers complained about Moubarak and his leadership, and he was sent back to Egypt. But, he arrived on the same day Nasser dismissed AM al-Ezz and 21 other top EAF officers, and appointed AM el-Hinnawy in his place. The latter picked Moubarak as Deputy Operations (No.3 in the hierarchy). Due to differences between el-Hinnawy and FM Fawzy, eventually Moubarak ended as Chief of Staff (No.2 in the hierarchy), and this opened the way for his subequent appointment as the C-in-C Air Force.
***********
That all said, in one of his earlier interviews, Okasha explained that the EAF lost 25 helicopters and around 400 mann during that mission. And this while he and his comrades from No.69 Squadron EAF were sitting in the cockpits of their Mirages, ready to take off - but Moubarak cancelled their participation.
***********
Meanwhile, 45 EAF pilots that felt offended by Heikal's statement have managed to bring him to a court. The first hearing took place on 11 July 2011:
http://elmokhalestv.com/index/details/id/4088
ראשי
צ'אט
18-04-2005, 01:22
) . 
. אין שום קשר להיכרות עם סיני (????) , שמצויין ציר בשם קוד סודי במפה שאמורה להיות סודית , למצרים נותר רק לנחש מהו הציר (בהסתברות נמוכה לחלוטין , כמעט אפסית) , ושוב - זמן מועט מאוד בתחילת המלחמה לאחר שידור מיקום של יחידה כזו או אחרת - היא טווחה , ובאש מאוד יעילה .
מצב כלאיים
